

with the objects in a painting or the parts of a sculpture). However, we can place the facts in their proper environment: we can extend the story into other stories, especially our own, and into the stories that we are familiar with from our reading. As Scholes says, "As semiotic interpreters we are not free to *make* meaning, but we are free to *find* it by following the various semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic paths that lead away from the words of the text" (1982: 30; italics in original).

The reader who is thus able to "find meaning" in the text (the *Lector in fabula*, Eco, 1979) is also a *co-creator* of the text. To collaborate with the author, readers follow the "various syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic" paths that lead into as well as "away from ... the text." Readers who can do this are competent or 'versatile.' In particular, competent readers work with the author to construct the 'fictional space' in which the characters play their roles to create, not a dead letter, but a living text re-created in the reader.

This reader-author relationship is a relation of mutual influence. If reading can be called a game, it is one in which each side's moves are affected by and affect those made by the other; it is a play in which all the players have a voice, including the reader.

See also: Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich (1895–1975); Context, Communicative; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Literary Pragmatics; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Overview.

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Pragmatics: History

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Pragmatics, the study of sign use and sign users in situations, is usually considered to be a fairly recent addition to the language sciences (see **Pragmatics: Overview**). The term *pragmatics* is generally said to date back to the work of the American semiotician and behaviorist Charles Morris and his distinction of

the three parts of semiotics: *syntactics*, *semantics*, and *pragmatics* (see **Semiotics: History**). The foundations for pragmatics as a linguistic discipline are regarded as having been laid by ordinary language philosophers and speech-act theorists such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, John L. Austin, John R. Searle, and H. Paul Grice (see **Austin, John Langshaw (1911–1960)**, and **Grice, Herbert Paul (1913–1988)**).

By adopting this new approach to language, studied as a kind of human action, philosophers and

linguists hoped to overcome an overly narrow study of language as a closed system to be analyzed in itself and for itself, as advocated in structuralist traditions of linguistics after Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomsky. Since the 1970s, pragmatics has become the focus of interest not only in mainstream linguistics, but also in communication studies, discourse analysis (including applied studies in the schoolroom or courtroom), conversation analysis, in psychology, the social sciences, artificial intelligence, and in the study of language and cognition. The study of language has therefore gradually widened its scope during the last half of the 20th century, from the *sign* to the use of signs in social situations, and from the *sentence* to the use of utterances in context.

Half a century after widening the scope of linguistics in this way, it has, however, become clear that a wider pragmatic perspective on language, social interaction, and mind had, in fact, already existed well before Austin made it popular in the 20th century (Nerlich and Clarke, 1996, 2000, where more references can be found) (see **Pragmatic Acts**).

This history of pragmatics will concentrate on uncovering the roots of the *different approaches to pragmatics* that one can distinguish in Europe and America: (1) the Anglo-Saxon approach which emerged from *ordinary language philosophy* with Wittgenstein, Austin, and Searle, and which has dominated the field, and which (2) developed concurrently with, but independent of, the school of *British contextualism and functionalism*; (3) the French approach, which is based on the *theory of enunciation* elaborated by Émile Benveniste; (4) the German approach (associated with the *critical theory movement* around Jürgen Habermas and Karl Otto Apel), which wants to study pragmatics as part of a general theory of (communicative) action.

These European traditions of pragmatic thinking were affiliated in various ways with the development of *pragmatism* as a new philosophy that emerged in the United States in the latter part of the 19th century, and which made the three-way split between syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics popular in linguistics, philosophy, and semiotics.

All approaches, the two Anglo-Saxon ones, the French one, the German one, and the American one, have their deeper roots in Antiquity, that is, in *rhetoric*. They are also all based, to various degrees, on Immanuel Kant's philosophy of the 'active (transcendental) subject' and on John Locke's philosophy of the 'semiotic act.'

These pragmatic modes of thought can be studied as *historical traditions*, but they can also be analyzed as *theoretical frameworks* that cluster around certain pragmatic key words:

1. Anglo-Saxon: speech act, meaning, use; meaning, intention, context, function
2. German: agenthood of (transcendental) subject, dialogue, pronouns
3. French: subjectivity, markers of subjectivity, indexicals
4. American: meaning as action, the triadic sign relation.

These four traditions should not be regarded as monolithic, unchanging, and exclusive. Since the 1970s, many approaches have developed that deal with language in use, such as, to mention just a few, the social pragmatics developed by Jacob Mey (Mey, 2001), also called *language in use* theory, the systemic-functional approach to language developed by Michael A. K. Halliday (Halliday, 1978), the various types of (critical) discourse analysis (see Mey, 1979, 1985; Beaugrande, 1996), and more recently the pragmatic and critical approach to metaphor analysis one could call the theory of *metaphor in use*.

Sources of Antagonism and Inspiration

It is generally assumed that language was studied as an *organism* in the 19th century and as a *system* in the 20th. This does not seem to leave much room for the study of language in use or in context or the study of the relationship between language and action. However, looking at disciplines adjacent to linguistics, such as various kinds of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and semiotics, one can discover that the roots of pragmatic thinking go back as far as the 19th and early 20th centuries. Inasmuch as these disciplines influenced the fringes of official linguistics, they also triggered pragmatic insights in linguistic thinking itself, especially in its reflection on meaning.

Those linguists who were interested in the meaning and use of language and not only, like the majority of their historical-comparative colleagues, in sound change, turned to an older source of pragmatic inspiration: rhetoric. Since antiquity, and since the Middle Ages as part of the trivium (rhetoric, grammar, logic), rhetoric had been part and parcel of language studies. However, in their efforts to constitute linguistics as an autonomous science, historical-comparative linguists had focused almost exclusively on the study of grammar, detaching it from the study of language in discourse (rhetoric) and from logic. By contrast, in their study of meaning and discourse, linguists and philosophers not working in the mainstream of historical-comparative linguistics made use of some of the concepts inherited from rhetoric (as for example the figures of speech, the situation of discourse, the interaction between speaker and hearer, and the

tripartition of grammar, logic, and rhetoric itself, which is at the root of many semiotic triads).

Among those who redefined and criticized the use of the concept of organism as a metaphor for the study of language, many also rejected an older philosophical theorem, namely that language represents thought (or ideas) and that only language that represents thoughts or the world is worthy of philosophical inquiry, as Aristotle had claimed in *De Interpretatione*, 17a, 1–5 (see Whitaker, 1996).

For pragmatic thinkers of all times, by contrast, language is not only there to represent true or false states of affairs, but it is used to influence others in specific ways, to communicate with others, to act upon others, and to make them act in certain ways, in other words, to change the world. This is why Austin later rejected the philosophy of language developed by those logical positivists who paid lip service to pragmatics, but still only studied statements as mapping onto states of affairs and the understanding of statements as the understanding of truth conditions. For some of the early pragmatists, as well as for the later ones, language was also not simply a system of conventional signs for the representation of thoughts. They reflected instead on the motivation underlying the signs' sound-structure and meaning, on the 'naturalness' of language, as one would say now, and on the sources of that motivation in the speakers and the speech situation, in the uses they make of signs in situations.

Early Pragmatic Insights

In Germany, the representational theory of language was undermined in the tradition of Kant, whose theory of the active organizing powers of the mind gave the impetus for a philosophy of language based on the mental acts of the speaker/hearer, especially in the works of Johann Severin Vater, August Ferdinand Bernhardt, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, published during the first two decades of the 19th century. These thinkers gradually replaced the philosophical study of the subject-object relation by a linguistic study of the subject-subject relation, and, in doing so, they developed a dialogical approach to language. The following quote from Vater's work, in which he develops a pragmatic conception of the sign (influenced by Locke's semiotics and Johann Heinrich Lambert's philosophy of language), will demonstrate this tradition, which ends with Humboldt's study of dialogue (for more information on the Kantian tradition, see Perconti (1999).

One can define these concepts [the sign, etc.] from the following points of view: (1) the one who signifies, (2) the one for whom one signifies, (3) the purpose of the

signification, (4) the success, the reciprocation of this purpose, (5) the sign, as the means, and (6) that which is signified (Vater, 1801: 137; all translations are Nerlich's).

Compare with Humboldt:

It is particularly relevant to language that duality has a much more important role in it than anywhere else. All speech is based on interlocution (*Wechselrede*), in which the speaker always posits the addressee as the one person opposite him, even when there are more people around. [...] To divide humanity into two classes, the natives and the enemies, is the basis of all primitive social bonding (Humboldt, 1963 [1827]: 137–138).

During the second half of the 19th century, the German pragmatic tradition focused even more on the role of the hearer and on language understanding in situation, possibly under the influence of the hermeneutical tradition (from Friedrich Schleiermacher to Wilhelm Dilthey).

In England, the representational theory of language was overthrown in the writings of the Scottish school of common sense philosophy, in particular the work of Thomas Reid. Reid remarked that Aristotle had been right to observe that

besides that kind of speech called a *proposition*, which is always either true or false, there are other kinds which are neither true nor false, such as a prayer or a wish; to which we may add, a question, a command, a promise, a contract, and many others (Reid, 1872, vol. II: 692).

However, according to Reid, Aristotle had been wrong in relegating the study of these speech acts other than the proposition to rhetoric (or to the domain of what is now called the pragmatic 'wastebasket' (see Mey, 2001: 12–15):

The expression of a question, of a command, or of a promise, is as capable of being analyzed as a proposition is; but we do not find that this has been attempted; we have not so much as given them a name different from the operations which they express (Reid, 1872, vol. I: 245).

Reid therefore developed a philosophical theory of meaning and a theory of speech acts that could accommodate these types of sentences. He stressed that, unlike statements, these other sentences are fundamentally 'social operations,' because their success necessarily depends on their uptake by others. Reid's views on language spread widely, from Scotland to England, mainly Cambridge, to the United States, and to France.

Whereas Reid had mainly focused on speech acts as social acts and thus contributed to speech-act theory *avant la lettre*, the philosopher and elocution teacher Benjamin Humphrey Smart developed a contextualist

theory of meaning as his contribution to a general theory of signs and to early pragmatics. In his *Outline of sematology: or an essay towards establishing a new theory of grammar, logic, and rhetoric* (Smart, 1831), Smart took up Locke's threefold division of knowledge into (1) *physiology*, or the study of nature, (2) *practology*, or the study of human action, and (3) *sematology*, the study of the use of signs for our knowledge, or, in short, the doctrine of signs (Smart, 1831: 1–2). His study deals with signs “which the mind invents and uses to carry on a train of reasoning independently of actual existences” (Smart, 1831: 2). For Smart, sematology (as later semiotics for Morris, and going back to the medieval trivium) had three parts: grammar, logic, and rhetoric. In all three parts, Smart makes it clear that signs do not *mean* ideas, they are *used* to mean something in *context*. He quotes the following passage from the work of the Scottish common sense philosopher Dugald Stewart, a follower of Reid:

our words, when examined separately, are often as completely insignificant as the letters of which they are composed; deriving their meaning solely from the connection, or relation, in which they stand to others (Stewart, 1854–1860, V: 154–155).

Smart was widely read, although it seems more by thinkers working outside linguistics proper, such as Charles Darwin. The term Smart used for his philosophy of language in context, *sematology*, was later used idiosyncratically by the German psychologist Karl Bühler, but Smart's theory of signs as part of his epistemology was also continued, to some extent, by those working in the tradition of ‘significs’ (see more on significs below).

Locke and the opposition to Locke were also important in France. Etienne Bonnot de Condillac and the Ideologues had based their philosophy of language in part on Locke's representationalism and empiricism, and saw in language a system of signs for the representation of ideas and sensations. After the French Revolution, in which the Ideologues had been involved, and during the French Restoration, their sensualist (and therefore quasi-materialist) philosophy of language was attacked by French philosophers and psychologists of the eclectic school, such as Victor Cousin, Théodore Jouffroy, and also Maine de Biran, who drew on ideas taken from Kant's philosophy of the active spirit, as well as from the common sense philosophers in Scotland and England, such as Reid. Based on their theories and Reid's conception of social acts, Adolphe Garnier formulated, about 1850, a theory of speech acts (orders and promises, for example) which highlighted the social aspects of speech acts, that is, both the interaction between

(the intention of) the speaker and (the understanding by) the hearer, and the interlocutors' social position in the context of discourse. However, Garnier's speech-act theory went almost unnoticed. It was only at the beginning of the 20th century that the legal philosopher Adolf Reinach formulated a similar, but much more elaborate, theory of speech acts, or what Reinach called, with Reid, *social acts*, based, in part, on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. For Reinach, speech acts, such as commands, can only exist *qua* command insofar as they are not divided up into a statement or *constatation* and its performance. They are both part of *the social act* (Reinach, 1913: 708; Engl. transl. 1983: 20), similar to what Jacob Mey (Mey, 2001: 206–235) later called *pragmatic acts* (see *Speech Acts; Pragmatic Acts*).

The Development of Pragmatics between 1850 and 1930

Gradually, Cousin's philosophy was replaced in France by Hippolyte Taine's rationalist and positivistic psychology. In Germany, too, psychology, especially Friedrich Herbart's mathematical psychology, became more important than philosophy for the advancement of the study of the nature of language. Herbart himself proposed that language could only be understood in the context of human action in general; a view repeated (without direct reference to Herbart, but totally in his spirit) by William Dwight Whitney in the United States (who also stressed the social dimension of language as an institution), by Johan Nicolai Madvig in Denmark (who stressed the role of context and developed a theory of meaning as use), and by Philipp Wegener in Germany who studied not only language in context but also what he called the *dialogic speech-act*, and what H. P. Grice was later to call *conversational implicatures* (see *Implicature, Grice, Herbert Paul* (1913–1988)). Wegener analyzed, for example, (elliptical) ‘statements’ that function as commands:

In the word-sentence ‘my boots’, the pure word-image does not trigger the representation of the facts that (1) somebody orders an action; (2) what that action is; (3) who should execute the action. All this can only be inferred from the situation and the gestures. The word-image only evokes the representation of a definite thing that the speaker has in mind as an object (Wegener, 1921: 9–10).

Heymann Steinthal, another follower of Humboldt and Herbart, and one of the most famous psychologists of language in the 19th century (read and criticized by Madvig, Whitney, Wegener, and many others), did not directly contribute to a pragmatic

theory of language, but, inspired by Steinthal's work and the Russian linguist Aleksandr A. Potebnya, developed an original theory of language and meaning based on the concept of psychological activity. (For the Russian tradition, especially Voloshinov and Bakhtin, see Nerlich (2000). See also Voloshinov, V. N. (ca. 1884/5–1936); Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich (1895–1975).)

In France, Taine's call *back to Condillac*, and his semiotic theory of signs, was heard by the linguist Michel Bréal who abhorred the widely used metaphor according to which words or meanings 'live and die' like biological organisms. Instead, he argued that

Our forefathers of the school of Condillac, those ideologists who for 50 years served as target to a certain school of criticism, were less far from the truth when they said, in simple and honest fashion, that words are signs. [...] *Words are signs*: they have no more existence than the signals of the semaphore, or than the dots and dashes of Morse's telegraphy (Bréal, 1964 [1900]: 249, italics ours).

However, Bréal did not only study language as a system of signs, but also as the expression of the speaking subject, who uses language to express emotions, beliefs, wishes, and demands, that is, to accomplish speech acts. He also analyzed the traces left in speech of the speaker using language, as for example the function of markers such as *nevertheless*, *hopefully*, etc. Furthermore, like Reid and others, Bréal criticized what Austin later called the *descriptive fallacy* in linguistic thinking. Compare:

Language is not only made to say: 'the sun shines on the countryside', 'the rivers flow into the sea'. Beyond that, language serves mainly to give expression to desires, demands, to be the expression of the will. It is this *subjective* side of language that should be studied more [...] (Bréal, 1877: 361–362).

The topic of the subjectivity in language was taken up by the French counterpart to Anglo-Saxon speech-act theory, viz., the theory of enunciation, as elaborated by Charles Bally, Gustave Guillaume, and Émile Benveniste and amalgamated with a theory of speech acts in the work of Oscar Ducrot. These French linguists also studied what they called the actualization of language (*la langue*) in speech (*parole*) through what Roman Jakobson, for example, called *shifters*, and Bally called *indicators*.

But Bréal not only initiated a study of subjectivity and indexicality in language, but also promoted a functionalist approach to language. Quite early on in his career, while actually introducing German historical-comparative linguistics to France, Bréal began to criticize its organicism and its way of studying

linguistic forms without taking into account their function. For Bréal, as for other 'functionalists' of that time (such as Wegener), function was the primary force of language change. Forms do not change in sound or meaning all by themselves, but because they are used with a specific function by the language user in discourse and in a certain situation. Other French functionalists were the psychologists Frédéric Paulhan and Henri Delacroix, and the linguist and medical doctor Eugène Bernard Leroy. Paulhan, in particular, established an explicit theory of speech acts in the context of a theory of linguistic functions that is directly comparable to that developed by Karl Bühler in Germany (more on Bühler below). Using an example that has become commonplace in pragmatic writing, he points out that:

[I]n order to understand the words 'it's raining', it suffices that, consciously or half-consciously, I take my umbrella with me when I want to go out. If I act in this way, I can really say that I have understood the words 'it's raining', even though I might not have associated them with any images that they represent (Paulhan, 1886: 47).

The German functionalists and speech-act theorists *avant la lettre* at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, especially Anton Marty and Bühler, were influenced by rationalist linguists such as Whitney, Madvig, Wegener, and Bréal on the one hand, but also, on the other, by new developments in psychology, such as the descriptive psychology developed by Franz Brentano, by the psychology of Gestalt, by phenomenological psychology, as well as by developments in social behaviorism.

Bühler (who was also a great admirer of Wegener) was working in the context of the Würzburg school of psychology, and he knew the work of Marty and Edmund Husserl well. He established the most elaborate theory of pragmatics in Germany (Bühler, 1934), of which his 'organon model' was the central part. In this model, he places the linguistic sign in its context of use, bringing into the model the speaker and hearer (forgotten in the semiotic triangle popularized by Charles K. Ogden and Ivor A. Richards) and the reference to 'things' (forgotten in Ferdinand de Saussure's famous speech circuit). The organon model, depicted by a triangle overlaid upon a circle, shows that every sign is at one and the same time a symptom (indicator, index) by virtue of its dependence on the sender (whose internal state it expresses), a signal by virtue of its appeal to the recipient (whose behavior it controls), and a symbol by virtue of its assignment to the objects and states of affairs (to which it refers). And so, every sentence is at one and the same time *expression*, *appeal*, and *representation*.

These are also the three main functions of language and sign use.

This functional and semiotic theory of language was further elaborated by linguists, such as Erwin Koschmieder and Alfons Nehring, as well as by philosophers, such as Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. Koschmieder, also influenced by Husserl, developed one of the first theories of performatives in Germany, a theory which can be directly compared to that which was being developed on the other side of the English Channel by Austin.

As early as 1929, Koschmieder had hinted at some puzzling syntactic phenomena of tense and aspect which would lead him to postulate a new "case of coincidence" (Koschmieder, 1965 [1945]: 26–27). He discussed the Hebrew equivalent of the sentence *I hereby bless him*, and pointed out that in such examples the action arises in the very utterance, that is to say: action and utterance coincide. He also used the example (later made famous through Austin): *Hiermit eröffne ich die Versammlung* ('I hereby open the meeting', i.e., 'I declare the meeting to be opened'), and he pointed out that *Hiermit schreibe ich einen Brief* ('I am hereby writing a letter') is impossible.

A Cambridge psychologist, George Frederick Stout, working toward the end of the 19th century, was also influenced by Brentano, as well as by Herbart and by Kant. From Kant, he took the insight into the active organizing powers of the individual in understanding the world and applied it to the individual using language. Stout was opposed to English associationism as proposed for example by Alexander Bain (Bain, 1855) and John Stuart Mill, and put forward a contextualist theory of language that incorporated some principles reminding one of the later Gestalt school of psychology. He was especially interested in the context-sensitivity of the notions of subject and predicate, thereby implicitly challenging linguistic analysis in terms of logic alone. He thus contributed to the development of ordinary language philosophy in Cambridge.

The psychological work of Paulhan and Stout was appreciated by the English philosopher and philanthropist Lady Victoria Welby, whose work on "meaning" (which she called *significs*) started an English and a Dutch school of pragmatics (named 'significa'), in which not only was context important, but language use and the whole speech event (including the speaker's intention and the hearer's interpretation) were taken into account (see Schmitz, 1990).

The English school of contextualism (Sir Alan Henderson Gardiner, Bronisław Malinowski, John Rupert Firth) was partly based on the work of Welby (just as later also was Ogden and Richards' work, who, too, can be counted among the functionalists)

on the one hand, and on the work of Wegener (which was much less metaphysical and more 'pragmatic' than Welby's) on the other. Gardiner wanted to analyze "acts of speech," Firth whole "speech events," and Malinowski wanted to study meaning as action. In his famous supplement (on meaning in primitive languages) to Ogden and Richards' book *The meaning of meaning*, Malinowski claimed that language is "a mode of action," especially of cooperation between people (Malinowski, 1923: 315).

The meaning of meaning also contained an extract of Peirce's work on semiotics as a direct result of Lady Welby's influence. In the early years of the 20th century, Lady Welby had corresponded with the father of pragmatism and semiotics, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce had inherited the term *pragmatisch* from Kant (in the latter's distinction between *practical* reason, that is, of the 'pure kind,' and *pragmatic* reason, that is, of the 'empirical' kind), and he knew the semiotic literature of the past well, from the Medieval philosopher Peter of Spain to Locke, Reid, and Welby. His counterpart, the pragmatist psychologist William James, by contrast, derived the term *pragmatism* from the Greek *práigma*, meaning 'practice', 'action'. And, whereas Peirce's *pragmatism* (a term Peirce introduced to set his theory off against James's) became part of his semiotics, as a general theory of signs and of meaning, James's *pragmatism* became part of a morally based psychology and theory of truth (see Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839–1914)).

Inspired in part by some principles of pragmatism, but also by Ogden and Richards' theory of signs and symbols, as well as by developments in logical positivism and behaviorism, the American Charles Morris is well-known for his tripartition of semiotics into *semantics*, as the study of the relationship between words and the world, *syntactics*, as the study of the relationship between words and words, and *pragmatics*, as the study of the relationship between words and their users (Morris, 1938). He made this the basis for a behavioristic type of semiotics.

The problem of 'meaning,' so important to Lady Welby and the pragmatists, became the focus of philosophical thinking worldwide. This was especially the case in England where, from the turn of the 19th century until the mid-20th century, it was leading up to the 'linguistic' and then 'pragmatic' turns in the philosophy of language. Initially, philosophers, such as the Oxford philosopher and classical scholar Austin, used linguistic analysis to find philosophical clarity; later, linguists used philosophical methods, such as those advocated by Austin, to study wider aspects of language. Here one can trace a line of thought leading from Gottlob Frege to Russell and

the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein I), to the later Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein II), Gilbert P. Ryle, Peter F. Strawson, Austin, H. Paul Grice, and finally to John Searle. Searle had written his Oxford D.Phil. thesis under Austin and Strawson on Frege's notion of sense and reference, and his concept of 'illocutionary force,' so central to pragmatics, can be traced back to Frege.

Pragmatism, Semiotics, and Speech Act Theory

As we have seen, many psychologists, philosophers, and linguists shared what Malinowski once called a "pragmatic *Weltanschauung*" (Malinowski, 1923: 328) at the turn of the 19th into the 20th century. They all regarded language as a mode of action and interaction. This conception was not unknown to Austin, who had read Gardiner, Morris, Peirce, and others. However, it seems that Austin neither wished to be associated with the contextualist-functionalist pragmatics developed on his doorstep (Nerlich, 1996), nor with the pragmatist, behaviorist, and semiotic pragmatics developed on the other side of the Atlantic by Morris, nor with the formal type of pragmatics developed by ideal language philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap. Austin also did not accept Morris's tripartition of semiotics into syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics; as he pointed out in 1940:

Now the reason why I cannot say 'the cat is on the mat and I don't believe it' is not that it offends against syntactics in the sense of being in some way "self-contradictory." What prevents me saying it, is rather some semantic convention (implicit, of course), about *the way we use words in situations* (Austin, 1963 [1940]: 10; italics ours).

And,

the supposed "ideal" language . . . is in many ways a most inadequate model of an actual language: its careful separation of syntactics from semantics, its list of explicitly formulated rules and conventions, and its careful delimitation of their spheres of operation – are all misleading. An actual language has few, if any explicit conventions, no sharp limits to the spheres of operation of rules, no rigid separation of what is syntactical and what semantical. (Austin, 1963 [1940]: 13).

It is astonishing to see that Austin does not use the term *pragmatics* in this context, as he implicitly argues for an integration of syntactics and semantics into pragmatics, being the study of the use of words or signs in the situation of a speech act.

Conclusion

Before Austin, the foundations for pragmatics had been laid by thinkers who stressed that:

- Signs are not only used for the expression of thought, but have various other functions.
- Signs have not only an intellectual but also an affective function.
- Sign use has basically three functions: representation, expression, and appeal.
- Signs can only be understood in the context of the situation in which they are used.
- Speaking is a goal-directed action.
- Signs are instruments used in the act of speech, and their use has practical effects and consequences.
- Signs are mainly used to influence others.
- Signs only function in dialogue and conversation; the reciprocity between speaker and hearer is important.
- Signs are used for the coordination of human behavior.
- Some signs are indexically linked to reality and the language users.

Rather late in the development of pragmatics are these ideas:

- Certain speech acts are self-referential.
- In saying something we are doing something.

See also: Austin, John Langshaw (1911–1960); Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich (1895–1975); Frege, Gottlob (1848–1925); Grice, Herbert Paul (1913–1988); Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839–1914); Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Overview; Rhetoric: History; Semiotics: History; Speech Acts; Voloshinov, V. N. (ca. 1884/5–1936).

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Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism

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The study of linguistic imperialism focuses on how and why certain languages dominate internationally, and on attempts to account for such dominance in an explicit, theoretically founded way. Language is one of the most durable legacies of European colonial and imperial expansion. English, Spanish, and Portuguese are the dominant languages of the Americas. In

Africa, the languages of some of the colonizing powers, England, France, and Portugal are more firmly entrenched than ever, as English is in several Asian countries.

The study of linguistic imperialism can help to clarify whether the winning of political independence led to a linguistic liberation of Third World countries, and if not, why not. Are the former colonial languages a useful bond with the international community and necessary for state formation and national unity internally? Or are they a bridgehead for Western interests, permitting the continuation of a global