Metaphtonymy: the interaction of metaphor and metonymy in expressions for linguistic action

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Abstract

In this contribution an exploration is offered of the ways in which metaphor and metonymy interact in conventionalized expressions where linguistic action is the target domain.

Working from a contemporary British data base, expressions from three donor domains are investigated, (i) violent action (ii) sound (iii) body parts. It appears that two types of interaction predominate: what I call metaphor from metonymy *and* metonymy within metaphor. *Metaphor from metonymy was found to be rare and metonymy from metaphor, though not impossible in principle, was absent in my data.*

The paper ends with suggestions as to why this asymmetrical distribution should exist, a tentative classification into two basic types, and an invitation to further investigation.

1. Introduction*

The purpose of this paper is to deepen our insight into the ways in which metonymy interacts with metaphor in figurative language. Although in principle metaphor and metonymy are distinct cognitive processes, it appears to be the case that the two are not mutually exclusive. They may be found in combination in actual natural language expressions. In that sense there might be room for the neologism in the title of this paper, for which I suggest the phonological realization [metæf'tɔnɪmɪ] to help the reader along if (s)he wishes to know whether the word is also pronounceable. It will be shown, however, that the interaction can take several forms, for which a single term may be misleading rather than helpful. In other words, I would like to assign *metaphtonymy* the status of a mere cover term which should help to increase our awareness of the fact that metaphor and metonymy can be intertwined.

To explore the interaction I have used a data base made up of stereotyped figurative expressions where the target domain is that of *linguistic action*. This data base is restricted and can therefore not be expected to provide an exhaustive account of the possible interaction patterns. On the other hand linguistic action is sufficiently complex and the data base exhibits enough diversity to allow us to come up with the main patterns, which in the final section of this paper will be put into a somewhat broader perspective.

In what follows I first remind the reader of a couple of basic insights into metaphor and metonymy (section 2) as well as into the target domain (section 3). Next, I provide a brief account of the data base and of the donor domains figuring in it (section 4). Sections, 5, 6 and especially 7 constitute the bulk of the paper: in them I explore the different ways in which metaphor and metonymy go together for the three donor domains in the data base in succession. Section 8 surveys these findings and tries to come up with a few generalizations about the interplay between metaphor and metonymy.

2. Metaphor and metonymy

As a representative of the traditional approach to metaphor and metonymy, the definitions in Halliday (1985: 319–320) can be quoted. Note that in this view a distinction is made between *synecdoche* and *metonymy*, though, obviously, synecdoche is a subtype of metonymy.

(i) *Metaphor.* "A word is used for something resembling that which it usually refers to; for example, *flood ... poured in*, ... in *A flood of protests poured in following the announcement (a large quantity ... came in)*. ... If the fact of resemblance is explicitly signalled by a word such as *like*, as in *protests came in like a flood*, this is considered to be not metaphor, but simile".

(ii) *Metonymy.* "A word is used for some thing related to that which it usually refers to; for example *eye ... in keep your eye on the ball* (gaze)".

(iii) *Synecdoche.* "A word is used for some larger whole of which that which it refers to is a part; for example *strings ... in At this point the strings take over* (stringed instruments)".

For an instance where synecdoche is viewed as part of metonymy, we can refer to Ullmann (1962: 212), who differentiates metonymy from metaphor as involving *contiguity* as opposed to *similarity*, where contiguity "includes any associative relations other than those based on similarity". Obviously, both Ullmann and Halliday concentrate on the use of *words*, whereas the

focus here is on *conventionalized expressions*. These can be expected to exhibit complexities not to be found at the level of the single word, though clearly we are a long way from the extreme fusion that Jakobson (1960: 370) posits for poetry, "where similarity is superinduced upon contiguity, and metonymy is slightly metaphorical and any metaphor has a metonymical tint".

In cognitive treatments metaphor and metonymy are viewed as *conceptual processes* in which the notion of *domains* plays a crucial role. Lakoff (1987: 288), for example, offers the following definitions:

(i) " ... metaphoric mapping involves a source domain and a target domain. ... The mapping is typically partial. It maps the structure in the source domain onto a corresponding structure in the target domain"

(ii) " ... a metonymic mapping occurs within a single conceptual domain which is structured by an ICM (= an Idealized Cognitive Model)".

In other words, the crucial difference between metonymy (as well as synecdoche) and metaphor is that in a metaphoric mapping two discrete domains are involved, whereas in a metonymy the mapping occurs within a single domain.

Given the difficulties that beset the crucial notion *resemblance* or *similarity* in the traditional approaches (see for example Cooper 1986: 14–15 and 184–186), I have tried in what follows to be in line with this cognitive approach. Obviously the hierarchy among cognitive domains, as well as their delimitation, which are important areas for exploration within cognitive linguistics anyway (see for example Langacker 1987: chapter 4), are important issues in this context. For the purposes of what follows we simply posit the existence of complex domains built up by the combination of other domains which themselves may either be complex or basic in the sense of Langacker (1987). It should also be expected in this view that the boundary lines between domains are often fuzzy, which is one of the reasons why metaphor and metonymy may interpenetrate.

3. The target domain: linguistic (inter)action

For discussions of the complexity involved in the domain linguistic (inter)action, we refer the reader to Dirven et al. (1982), Verschueren (1984 and 1985) and Rudzka-Ostyn (1988). Without going into details, I would like to emphasize two aspects of this complexity here.

(i) In linguistic (inter)action a speaker produces utterances by means of natural language to make known his ideas, beliefs, wishes to one or more hearers who process those utterances and, in turn, may become speakers

to do the same. *Talking about* linguistic interaction involves *secondary* speakers who produce utterances in which they *report* to *secondary* hearers what was said by *primary speakers* to *primary hearers*. Both primary and secondary speakers are equipped with their own beliefs and emotions and make use of specific linguistic forms as well as specific communication channels. All this produces a complex network of relationships and structures, which is nevertheless conceived as hanging together, in other words, as one complex conceptual domain. (ii) As a complex domain, the domain of linguistic (inter)action intersects with (or: partially incorporates) several basic and non-basic domains, such as *sound language*, *human actions*, *emotions*, *human cognition*, *perception*, etc. For a (tentative) schema we refer to Rudzka-Ostyn (1988: 510).

4.   Data base and donor domains

4.1.   *Donor domains*

We have studied the interaction of metaphor and metonymy in a data base of figurative expressions for linguistic (inter)action from three different donor domains which are fairly discrete (though there is a slight degree of overlap between them). They are *body parts*, *sound* and *violent action*. Let me give a brief characterization of each of these in turn.

(i) *Body parts*

There appear to be a considerable number of figurative expressions for linguistic (inter)action which contain lexical items denoting parts of the body, more specifically of the human body. To the extent that certain human body parts are instrumental in linguistic (inter)action, we can expect there to be an intersection with the target domain, but evidently this does not hold for all of them. It should also be emphasised from the start that as a rule the body parts are not donor for linguistic action on their own. In the majority of cases the body part fits into a more complex domain or scene which has to be processed with reference to linguistic (inter)action in its own right.

(ii) *Sound*

An obvious restriction here is that *sound* is to be understood as sound that can be perceived by the human ear. Another one is that literal references to linguistic sounds (as in *shout* or *whisper*) are excluded. Otherwise it is also the case here that a given figurative expression usually relates to a donor scene for which a more specific characterization than *sound* is required.

(iii) *Violent action*

More specifically, our third donor domain is that of *physical* violent action, which itself is a subdomain of the vast domain of human action. Again this is an important donor domain for linguistic (inter)action, not unexpectedly, given the connection with the *Argument-is-war*-metaphor identified by Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

4.2. *The data base*

The data base consists of 309 items, distributed as follows:

— *Body parts*, 109 items; 86 verbials (i.e. verbs or expressions with verbs which, in turn, may contain nominals), 12 adjectivals (which also include some participial items) and 11 nominals
— *Sound*, 100 items, all verbials
— *Violent action*, 100 items, also all verbials.

The main source for this data base is *Longman's Dictionary of Contemporary English*; the material is predominantly, but not exclusively, British English. For the.way the data were collected we refer to Vanparys (1989). The *sound* and *violent action* expressions also include a few items from other contemporary lexicographic sources; in actual fact I have used the data bases established by Van Deun (1988) (for the *sound* corpus) and by Govaers (1988) (for the items where *violent action* is donor). Note also that the *body part* data differ somewhat from the corpus used by Pauwels and Vandenbergen (1989) in spite of the common core.

Given the fact that these data originate from a contemporary dictionary/ dictionaries which itself/themselves is/are based on an extensive data base, we can safely assume them to be representative of everyday metaphor and metonymy, and in that sense of the figurative language that the speakers of (mainly British) English "live by".

5. Analysis of the sound data

Van Deun (1988: 68–79) distinguishes the following sub-categories (according to the type of sound involved):

(i) *human sound* (27 items; *applaud, giggle, wheeze* and the like);
(ii) *animal sound* (43 items; *bark, cackle, purr, squeal*, etc.);
(iii) *non-human, non-animal, natural sound* (8 items; *blast, thunder*, etc.);
(iv) *artificial sound produced by musical instruments* (9 items; *blow one's own trumpet, harp on, pipe down*, etc.);

(v) *artificial sound not made by musical instruments* (the remaining 13 items).

As a rule the donor domain is clearly distinct from the target domain, there is a mapping from one domain into another, hence we get pure metaphors. Typical examples are:

— *bark* "say something in a sharp loud voice": the loud, penetrating sound of barking dogs is mapped onto linguistic action where the sound is perceived as loud, harsh or sharp;

— *blow one's own trumpet* "say good thing about oneself, perhaps immodestly, so that others will know them": the public and festive character of trumpet blowing, in combination with the added reflexive dimension, is mapped onto self-praise. To the extent that we may conceive of a scene in which the trumpet blowing is followed by a public statement in which the announcer "says good things about himself", we might accept a metonymic basis for the expression. Since such an interpretation is far removed from the prototypical scene of trumpet blowing, however, such a metonymic basis is very weak, to say the least.

The items in the first group, on the other hand, but only those, usually have a metonymic ingredient. Let us have a closer look at *giggle* "express by or utter with a giggle" as a paradigm case. A typical example would be (1).

(1)   "Oh dear", she giggled, "I'd quite forgotten".

One interpretation is that she said this *while* giggling: in that case there is a synecdochic relationship; we express part for the whole, we have a pure metonymy. Another way to interpret it is that she said this *as if* giggling; hence there is a crossing of domain boundaries, we have a metaphor. The point is, however, that in this metaphorical interpretation, the conceptual link with the metonymic reading is still present. We denote a kind of speech that shares the light-heartedness or the silliness, and perhaps even some physical features with giggling properly speaking: this is what I would like to call *metaphor* from *metonymy*. Figure 1 tries to visualize this. On the left hand side of the figure two potentially discrete domains, A and B, intersect; they are fused in a single scene (the surrounding circle). On the right hand side, A and B are separated, but, as the broken arrow indicates, there remains a conceptual link with the scene in which the two are together. The double possibility (metaphor from metonymy or metonymy only) holds for most items in group (i) (19 out of 27). It follows that not unfrequently both the metonymy reading and the metaphor-from-metonymy interpretation could fit a given context: it is typical of these items that in context their interpretation will sometimes

Figure 1.   *Metaphor from metonymy*

have to remain "undecided". Obviously for some of them the metaphorical reading is the natural one, for example, for *applaud* "express strong agreement with (a person, idea, etc.)", as in (2).

(2)   These changes will be applauded.

An (exceptional) example of a *metaphor from metonymy* from the other groups is *snap at* "say or answer in an angry or rude way". The literal meaning denotes the quick closing of jaws, especially of an animal, for example of a dog. Since, however, human beings also have the capacity to close their jaws quickly and forecefully, and since this may occasionally accompany angry speech, the expression can also be said to have a (weak) metonymic basis. Note, for that matter, that the donor domain for *snap at* can also be taken to be violent (animal) action, as well as *animal sound*; in actual fact *snap at* was also included in the violent action corpus.

In conclusion, we find that the donor domain *sound* gives rise to several metonymie, or metaphors from metonymy, precisely in those cases where sound hangs together with a human activity that can naturally co-occur with linguistic action. Typically, these items have a hybrid character, in that they are metonyms in some contexts, metaphors from metonymy in others and sometimes undecided between these two interpretations in actual contexts.

6.   The violent action data

Physical violent action is sufficiently distinct from linguistic (inter)action not to overlap or coexist with it in the very great majority of cases. As a rule therefore the figurative expressions in our data base involve a mapping from one domain onto another, in other words, they are metaphors.

In the whole subcorpus of 100 verbials there were only six or seven items for which a metonymic ingredient can be suggested. All of these are of a type where the violent action *could* be accompanied by verbal action, for example, *throw mud at* "speak badly of, especially so as to spoil someone's good name unncessarily". It is conceivable that people may combine the violent action with *shouting names*, which is linguistic action:

this would be an instance of metonymy. The metaphorical interpretation can easily be established, however, without this metonymic backing. What this adds to our insight, is that metaphor from metonymy occurs with varying degrees of cognitive saliency; instances like the one discussed here provide us with the limiting case (it may well be argued not to be an instance of metaphor-from-metonymy at all). Another instance of this sort is *give a rap on/over the knuckles* "attack with sharp words", an item which also occurs in the body part corpus.

7. The body part corpus

7.1. *Some further characterization of the data*

Before embarking on a discussion of the interplay of metaphor and metonymy, we first provide some further characterization of the 109 items making up our data base. We do this from two points of view.

To begin with, the corpus can be subclassified according to different groups of body parts:

(i) 49 items contain a body part which could be instrumental in the speech act: 15 with *mouth*, 15 with *tongue*, 7 with *lip(s)*, 3 with *breath* (not really a body part, but so closely associated with the body that we decided to include it), 2 with *jaw*, 2 with *throat*, one with *chin* and one with *voice* (an item for which the same remark holds as for *breath*);

(ii) 26 items contain a body part which is connected with the *head* but not potentially functional in the act of speaking (this includes the item *head* itself): 6 with *head* (I have listed here *tête-à-tête*, which is actually from French), another 6 with *ear(s)* (which, of course, may be instrumental in the perception of speech), 3 with *neck*, 2 with *nose*, 2 with *eye(s)*, 2 with *brain*, one with *brow*, *eyebrow*, *cheek*, *hairs* and *profile*;

(iii) The *trunk* of the body is involved in items with *heart* (6), *breast* (2), *chest* (1), *bosom* (1), *belly* (2), *back* (3) (15 in all);

(iv) 10 items are connected with the *hand*, including *hand* itself (6 times), *palm* (1), *finger* (1), *knuckles* (2);

(v) the leg or part of it are represented 7 times: *legs* (1), *foot/feet* (4), *knee(s)* (2);

(vi) finally, there are two items with *blood*, again a "body part" only in the loose sense of the word.

Secondly, it must be pointed out that the role played by the body part varies according to whether we have a verbial, an adjectival, or a nominal. In the case of verbials and adjectivals the body part is necessarily inte-

grated into some broader scene. Nominals, on the other hand, may be directly related to an aspect of linguistic action, though also here there may be a combination with another item, so that the body part is instrumental in a broader scene as well. As we shall find, this considerably increases the complexity with which metaphor and metonymy may interact.

7.2. *Metaphor and metonymy in the body part corpus*

General survey. Obviously, the data show up a considerable portion of what we may refer to as *pure* metaphors and metonyms. This is only to be expected, since in collecting the items the criterion was that they should be "figurative". As was indicated for the other two subcorpora, this results in a set of data which are predominantly metaphorical. The striking fact about the body part data therefore is rather that there are so many instances with a metonymic ingredient, i.e. either *pure metonyms* or *mixed cases* (where *mixed* implies that there is some interplay of metaphor and metonymy). Table 1 surveys the proportion of *pure metaphors, pure metonyms*, and *mixed cases* in the corpus. I have added the distribution over the verbials, adjectivals and nominals, because it is not insignificant.

In the context of this paper it is, of course, the mixed cases that are of interest; they will be explored under the following subheadings. Before proceeding with that discussion, let me draw the reader's attention to the high proportion of pure metonyms for the nominals as opposed to their complete absence for adjectivals. This hangs together with the fact that it is easier to select *entities* which are part of, or otherwise associated with, other entities as representatives for those other entities than it is to represent *properties* by partial or associated properties (where I take for granted that the categorial meaning for nominals is the denotation of entities and for adjectivals the denotation of properties). As will appear from the instantiations for the mixed cases, it is usually (but not always)

Table 1. *Distribution in the body part data*

	Data base 109	Verbials 88	Adjectivals 11	Nominals 10
Pure metaphors	42	36	5	1
Pure metonyms	8	5	0	3
Mixed cases	59	47	6	6
—Metonymy in metaphor	(27)	(19)	(4)	(4)
—Metaphor from metonymy	(27)	(24)	(2)	(1)
—Special cases	(5)	(4)	(0)	(1)

the integration of a nominal element into the verbial or the adjectival that is responsible for the metonymic ingredient in an otherwise metaphorical context.

Metaphor from metonymy.   This pattern, which frequently occurs when the donor domain is (non-linguistic) human sound (see section 5), is also well represented in the body part data. In my analysis there are 27 items (24 verbials, 2 adjectivals, 1 nominal), i.e. practically one fourth of the data, that belong here. Again the boundary lines with pure metaphors and pure metonyms are sometimes a little hazy, but there is no doubt that the great majority of those 27 can safely be assigned to this type. For all of them it is possible to use them metonymically, that is with reference to a scene where both the non-linguistic and the linguistic action reading are relevant, and it is that metonymic reading which is the basis for the metaphorical use. As a rule, however, there is an idea of transfer from a distinct scene; in other words, we get metaphors for which there is a link with their metonymic origin. In the following exemplification it will also appear that the relevant scenes have to be characterized in their own right; the body part is just an ingredient in a broader scene. This accounts for the fact that there is no significant correlation with any of the subgroups distinguished in 7.1. Let me provide a few instances now with a word of explanation.

— *Say something/speak/talk with one's tongue in one's cheek* "say something and mean the opposite, especially in an insincere or ironic way".

The metonymic basis is a scene in which someone literally (and visibly) pushes his tongue into his cheek while saying something that he does not really mean; in this metonymic reading — unlike in the (admittedly improbable) literal interpretation — the tongue in the cheek is taken to be intentionally linked up with the ironic impact of what the speaker says. As a rule, however, we use the expression to express that the primary speaker says something *as if* he had his tongue in his cheek; there is a mapping from a donor scene onto the target scene. When we use it of insincere, rather than ironic speech, the expression is even necessarily metaphorical, at least to the extent that an insincere speaker does not want to give away that what is said is not really meant.

— *Beat one's breast* "make a noisy open show of sorrow that may be partly pretence".

Here the metonymic basis is the religious practice of beating one's breast while one confesses one's sins publicly.

— *Close-lipped* "silent or saying little".

Let me emphasize here that the metonymic reading and the interpreta-

tion as metaphor from metonymy can be expected to be equally frequent. *Close-lipped* can be paraphrased as literally meaning "having the lips close together" or as "having the lips closed"; when *close-lipped* is used to indicate that a person is literally silent, we therefore need the metonymic reading. If, on the other hand, we describe as *close-lipped* someone who is actually talking a lot, but does not give away what one would really want to hear from him, we have a metaphor (and given the saliency of the metonymic basis, a metaphor from metonymy).

A general point which should have emerged from the discussion is that the chances that metaphors from metonymy are used purely metonymically are variable. They are probably better for items like *have a word in someone's ear* "speak secretly" or *raise one's eyebrows at* "express surprise, doubt, displeasure or disapproval (at)" than for *beat one's breast* or *put one's foot down* "speak or act firmly on a particular matter".

Metonymy within metaphor. In this pattern, which appears in the body part data only, we get metaphors (involving therefore a mapping from a donor domain A onto the discrete target domain B, which in our data evidently is linguistic (inter)action), but with a built-in metonymy. This metonymy involves the body-part which is a shared element in both domains (A and B). This situation can be pictured as in Figure 2, where the shared element, the body-part, is represented as x. Because of its different function in the two domains, it is differentiated as x and x' in the donor and recipient domain.
Note that this representation does not yet give us the whole story about the shared item x/x'. A couple of examples will show that as a rule it functions metonymically in the target domain only, whereas it is interpreted literally or (more often) (re)interpreted metaphorically in the donor domain.

— *Bite one's tongue off* (informal) "be sorry for what one has just said", typically in contexts like (3).

(3)   I should/could bite my tongue off.

Figure 2.   *Metonymy within metaphor*

Here *tongue* can be processed literally in the donor scene. Because of the counterfactual contextualization this donor scene can be one that does not directly tie up with everyday experience. Perhaps the best way to characterize it is in terms of self-punishment, where the punishment hyperbolically involves a rather unlikely kind of self-mutilation. Mapping this onto linguistic action we get something like "depriving oneself of one's ability to speak", where the metonymy is from *tongue* to the *speech faculty* as a whole. It is this metonymy that motivates the choice of *tongue* rather than *finger*, for example (as a result a similar expression like *I could have kicked myself* does not specifically denote linguistic action). The hyperbolic nature then generates an implicature in the Gricean sense along the lines of "I'm terribly sorry for having said something so foolish, rude, or the like".

— *Shoot one's mouth off* "talk foolishly about what one does not know about or should not talk about".

The donor domain is the foolish or uncontrolled use of firearms: the foolish (and therefore potentially, though not intentionally, dangerous) use of a gun is mapped onto unthoughtful linguistic action. By integrating *mouth* into a scene relating to the use of firearms it is reinterpreted as having properties of a gun in the donor domain; this is the metaphorization in the donor domain. In the recipient domain, however, there is a first level of interpretation which amounts to something like "using one's mouth foolishly", in which *mouth* is a metonymy for *speech faculty*. Again the significance of the metonymy becomes clear, if one replaces *mouth* by parts of the body which are less or not functional in the act of speaking (such as *nose* or *eyes*). Hence an utterance like (4) comes to mean "Don't say anything rash".

(4) Don't shoot your mouth off.

— *Catch someone's ear* "catch someone's sympathetic attention or notice" as in (5).

(5) She caught the minister's ear and persuaded him to accept her plan.

This invokes a scene of an entity (animal, bird, insect, or even human being) running or flying around which one tries to get hold of. From the point of view of the donor domain *the minister's ear* has to be reinterpreted (metaphorically) as an entity on the move; in the target domain it is used metonymically for the minister and for the minister's attention. Note, by the way, that in this instance (as was pointed out by one of my anonymous reviewers) an alternative interpretation as metaphor-from-metonymy should be considered: besides its literal meaning, *catch some-*

one's ear can be taken metonymically to designate the more complex process of getting someone to listen; this metonymy can be the basis of a metaphor-from-metonymy. The greater relevance (at least for me) of the metonymy-within-metaphor interpretation hangs together with the possibility of a metaphorical interpretation of *catch X* as well as the cognitive salience of the *ear-(linguistic) attention* metonymy.

Again, the pattern is comparatively frequent in this subcorpus: nearly one fourth of the items are of this type. With two or three exceptions they are all verbials where the body part is involved in a broader scene. Note also that here there is a very strong correlation with the body parts that can be functional in linguistic action: all instances come from groups (i) and (ii).

Demetonymization inside a metaphor. There is at least one instance of what can be described as a demetonymization inside a metaphor: *pay lip service to* "support in words, but not in fact; give loyalty, interest etc. in speech, while thinking the opposite".

At first sight this may seem to be another example of metonymy within metaphor. *Paying* suggests a scene of discharging one's debts; that scene is the "embedding metaphor". *Lip service* is "service with the lip(s)", where *lip(s)* stands for *speaking*, which is a metonymy (one with a biblical origin, see Goossens (i.p.), but no doubt "securalized" for most speakers of English today). However, to make the figurative expression work, we have to expand our paraphrase for *lip service* into "service as if with the lips only"; the part is dissociated from the whole for which it was made to stand in the earlier processing stage, it is "demetonymized".

Metaphor within metonymy. Also this type is represented by one instance only: *be/get up on one's hind legs* "stand up in order to say or argue something, esp. in public".

The peculiarity about this item is perhaps best revealed if we leave out *hind: being/getting up on one's legs* with reference to "standing up in order to say something in public" is metonymic, there is an overall scene of somebody standing up *and* saying something publicly. The addition of *hind* forces us to reinterpret the expression in terms of an animal standing up. This suggests a greater effort, an event which attracts more attention. At the same time there is a bathetic effect, because a human being is interpreted as being involved in the pseudo-achievement of standing on two legs. One may, of course, also argue that the addition of *hind* makes the expression as a whole metaphorical; it is only to the extent that we process it with an awareness of the metonymy, that it is more adequate to view this as a metaphor embedded into a metonymy.

8. Some further perspective

The foregoing analyses have given us an initial, though not fully representative, picture of the ways in which metaphor and metonmy can interact. Let us first review the patterns that were observed. I list them with an indication of the frequency with which they occurred.

(i) *Metaphor from metonymy.* This was a frequent type in the figurative expressions where the donor domain is human (non-linguistic) sound, and well represented in the body part data. The main point here is that underlying the metaphor there is an awareness that the donor domain and the target domain *can* be joined together naturally in one complex scene, in which case they produce a metonymy, of course. The actual contexts into which these items fit will be decisive for the interpretation as either a metonymy or a metaphor from metonymy, with, of course, a fuzzy area where it is difficult to decide which of the two is the more relevant interpretation.

(ii) *Metonymy within metaphor.* Although less frequent than (i) in our data base, this pattern was also quite current, be it only in the body part corpus. The typical case for (ii) is that a metonymically used entity is embedded in a (complex) metaphorical expression. The metonymy functions within the target domain. As we found out in the instances we analysed, this often, but not necessarily, goes together with a metaphorical reinterpretation of the relevant entity in the donor domain.

(iii) *Metaphor within metonymy.* This type is extremely rare in our data and I assume that it is rare in general. Probably this hangs together with the fact that if we embed a metaphor into a metonymy, it tends to "metaphorize" the whole expression. It is only in intances where the metonymic reading remains relevant (as in *be/get up on one's hind legs*, which was discussed above) that this pattern occurs.

(iv) *Demetonymization in a metaphorical context.* This is also an exceptional type. In the example we found (*pay lip service to*) it turned out that the metonymic reading (*lip* for *saying something*) was relevant, but that at the same time the overall metaphorical context favours an interpretation in which the metonymic extension is abandoned ("service by means of the lips only").

These findings raise a couple of questions which I will briefly go into next.

First, we may wonder whether the mirror image for type (i) is possible, i.e. *metonymy from metaphor.* I would like to suggest that it is, though it is rather difficult to conceive and therefore very rare. Let me try to construct an example with an item which occurred in my discussion of the

sound data in section 5. I pointed out there that *blow one's own trumpet* is an instance of metaphor because it is difficult to conceive of the scene of trumpet blowing and that of self-praise as being combined. Suppose, however, that the two *do* occur together and that we use an utterance like (6) to describe this (admittedly unlikely) scene.

(6) Remarkable, the chap is blowing his own trumpet!

In such a case we would be forced to become aware of the metonymic interpretation, but to the extent that we are also conscious of the fact that we know that the expression is basically metaphorical, we will process it as a metonymy from metaphor.

This leads to a second question. Why is it that metaphor from metonymy is quite current, whereas it is difficult to come up with good instances of metonymy from metaphor?

Let me repeat in this context that for metaphor we map an element from a donor domain onto an element of a *discrete* recipient domain. For a metonymy the mapping is from an element A to an element B within the *same* (structured) conceptual domain. Metaphor from metonymy implies that a given figurative expression functions as a mapping between elements in two discrete domains, but that the perception of "similarity" is established on the basis of our awareness that A and B are often "contiguous" within the same domain. This frequent contiguity provides us with a "natural", experiential, grounding for our mapping between two discrete domains.

Going from metaphor to metonymy is conceptually more difficult, because here it is implied that the two domains are in principle discrete. The case where the mapped elements in a basically metaphorical expression can be interpreted as belonging to the same (complex) domain is rare as it were by definition, because, if it were frequent, we would automatically get a metaphor from metonymy.

This does not yet explain why metonymy *within* metaphor occurs frequently, but not metaphor within metonymy. In both cases we get a complex mapping, where for metonymy within metaphor a metonymic mapping is inserted into a metaphoric one and for a metaphor within metonymy a metaphor becomes an ingredient in a metonymic expression. As will have become clear from the discussion of the examples in section 7.2, metonymy within metaphor is possible only if in the donor domain the element which becomes metonymic in the recipient scene can either be processed literally or be reinterpreted metaphorically. In other words, the metonymy is integrated into the metaphor, but the metaphor maintains itself, it is not "destroyed" by the superimposed metonym. In the case of a metaphor within metonymy, on the other hand, at least in the

single example we have found in our data (*be/get up on one's hind legs*) the addition of an element from a discrete domain (*hind* in our instance) tends to metaphorize the whole expression; it is only by virtue of the strong cognitive salience of the metonymic alternative (*be/get up on one's legs*) that the complex interpretation as metaphor within metonymy becomes relevant. A metaphor inserted into a metonym would seem to metaphorize the whole, whereas a metonym integrated into a metaphor does not appear to have the power to metonymize the metaphor.

Finally, I would like to suggest that "metaphtonymies" can be assigned to two basic types, which I shall label *integrated metaphtonymy* and *cumulative metaphtonymy* respectively.

By *integrated metaphtonymy* I mean the type in which in one and the same expression a metonymy and a metaphor are combined. This category includes metonymy within metaphor and metaphor within metonymy. *Cumulative metaphtonymy* implies that a metaphor is derived from a metonymy or vice versa. This is the case in metaphor from metonymy (where the end product is a metaphor), as well as in the apparently rare instances of metonymy from metaphor (where the result is a metonym).

In addition, it would seem that it is also possible to have a combination of the two types in instances of the kind illustrated in (7), where *iron horse* is a (somewhat dated) metaphor for *locomotive* and, on top of it, is used metonymically for the *locomotive's tender*.

(7)   (Spoken by the driver of a steam train)
      I'm first going to fill up my iron horse (i.e. with coal)

This combined type did not occur in my data, but is frequently attested in studies in historical semantics (Dirk Geeraerts, personal communication). It is clear, for that matter, that it would be worth reconsidering the interaction between metaphor and metonymy from a diachronic point of view.

Obviously, this is only one of the ways in which the findings and proposals of this paper are in need of further investigation.

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